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1	 Este	artículo	es	un	avance	del		trabajo	que	desarrolla	el	autor	en	el	Proyecto	“La	contribución	de	los	bienes	
y	servicios	ambientales	en	el	desarrollo.	Consideraciones	del	debate	global	para	Colombia”,	de	la	línea	de	in-
vestigación	“Desarrollo	Sostenible”,	del	Observatorio	de	Análisis	de	los	Sistemas	Internacionales,	OASIS.
During	the	1980s	and	1990s	many	
environmental	NGOs	 and	 the	 scientific	
community	have	stressed	the	idea	of	glo-
bal	 commons	 that	were	 in	 risk,	which	
was	considered	the	case	of	the	main	en-
vironmental	problems:	loss	of	biological	
diversity,	climate	change,	loss	of	the	ozone	
layer,	 and	 degradation	 of	 the	marine	
environment	 (Wood	 2000,	 3).	 Ecolo-
gists	declared	that	species	extinction	has	
greatly	increased	due	to	human	activities	
the Convention on biological 
Diversity or the international 
construction of a contentious 
global common1
and	 interventions	 into	 the	nature.	This	
was	portrayed	dramatically	as	 the	 ‘sixth	
mass	 extinction’	 of	 life	 forms	 in	Earth	
(Wilson	 cited	 in	 Boisvert	 and	Vivien	
2005:	463).	
The	 problems	 of	 the	 global	 com-
mons	are	understood	as	‘problems	whose	
manifestation	might	be	local	or	national	
but	whose	consequences	would	be	global	
in	scale’.	As	a	result,	‘the	costs	of	inaction	
would	be	global	in	scope	so	the	responsi-
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bility	for	addressing	the	problems	–	even	
if	 its	manifestation	was	 highly	 localized	
–	should	be	borne	by	the	global	commu-
nity’	(Wood	2000,	3).	In	this	perspective,	
local	 environmental	 problems	 are	 pre-
sented	 as	 essentially	 transboundary	 that	
require	the	development	of	‘global	science’	
to	be	analysed,	international	institutions	
to	manage	them	and	the	prescription	of	
‘global	solutions’	(Goldman	1998:	3-4).	
The	 idea	of	biodiversity	as	 a	global	
common	 implies	 the	 conception	 of	 a	
‘new’	discourse	based	on	the	macro-scale	
of	the	environmental	problems	but,	more	
important,	it	also	involves	the	creation	of	
new	authorities,	new	forms	of	valuation	
and	appropriation.	As	Saurin	highlights,	
the	environmental	crisis	
(…)	is	primarily	a	social	crisis	rather	than	a	
natural	crisis,	in	the	sense	that	what	is	at	stake	are	
the	forms	and	particular	processes	of	accumulation	
and	social	reproduction,	albeit	now	on	a	global	scale.	
More	specifically	this	means	that	both	the	processes	
of	environmental	change	and	the	explanations	one	
provides	of	those	changes	need	to	be	understood	as	
part	of	a	larger	recomposition	of	social	and	economic	
relations,	and	of	the	reconfiguration	of	political	and	
economic	relations	on	a	global	scale.	(2001:	65-6)	
This	perspective	may	help	to	under-
stand	the	diverse	aspects	and	non	evident	
economic	and	political	implications	that	
surround	multilateral	 environmental	
agreements,	 such	 as	 the	Convention	on	
Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	that	was	signed	
at	 the	United	Nations	Conference	 on	
Environment	and	Development	held	 in	
Rio	de	Janeiro	in	1992.
The	 underlying	 terms	 of	 the	CBD	
are	 those	 of	 ‘ecological	modernisation’,	
expressed	by	Hajer	(1995).	They	are	the	
expression	 of	 different	 state	 and	 non-
state	actors	with	a	wide	array	of	different	
interests	 and	 ideological,	 political	 and	
economic	 commitments	 in	 the	 global	
economy	 that	 claim	 to	 have	 authority	
over	 the	 global	 commons.	 Such	 actors	
are	 industrialised	 states,	 states	 ‘rich’	 in	
biodiversity	 or	 so-called	megadiverse,	
environmental	NGOs,	 scientific	 com-
munities,	 biotechnological	 and	 natural	
resource-based	industries,	indigenous	and	
local	 communities,	 among	 others.	The	
big	 failure	 of	 ecological	modernisation	
as	an	environmental	discourse	 is	 that	 it	
‘does	not	 call	 for	 any	 structural	 change	
but	 is,	 in	 this	 respect,	 basically	 a	mod-
ernist	and	technocratic	approach	to	the	
environment	 that	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	
a	techno-institutional	fix	for	the	present	
problems.’	(Hajer	1995:	32)
This	 essay	 is	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 con-
struction	of	 the	concept	of	global	 com-
mons,	which	 fits	 into	 the	 discourse	 of	
ecological	modernisation,	 by	 using	 the	
example	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 the	Con-
vention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity.	The	
understanding	of	biological	diversity	as	a	
global	common	is	very	problematic	and	
supposes,	 with	 dubious	 assumptions,	
to	have	a	solution	of	the	environmental	
problems	 through	 the	 commoditization	
of	biological	resources.	In	order	to	do	so,	
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a	legal	international	framework	has	been	
created.	The	Convention	 on	Biological	
Diversity	 is	 an	 attempt	 to:	 i)	 re-shape	
state	sovereignty	and	global	authority	over	
the	multiple	forms	of	biological	diversity	
including	genetic	resources	and	allow	to	
some	 actors	 gain	 power	 and	 authority;	
and	 ii)	 facilitate	 the	 recognition	of	bio-
logical	 and	 genetic	material	 as	 valuable	
resources	 for	 a	wider	 incorporation	 of	
them	into	the	global	economy.	Although	
the	Convention	calls	for	the	preservation	
of	the	biosphere,	it	also	set	a	framework	
for	a	wider	appropriation	of	nature,	a	mix	
that	has	proved	to	be	highly	contradictory	
and	conflicting.	
In	words	of	Hajer:	‘the	discourse	of	
ecological	modernization	puts	the	mean-
ing	of	the	ecological	crisis	upside-down:	
what	first	appeared	a	threat	to	the	system	
now	becomes	a	vehicle	for	its	innovation.’	
(Hajer	1995:	32).	Moreover,	it	opens	the	
door	 to	more	 adventurous	 incursions	
from	other	international	regimes	and	their	
institutions,	for	instance	world	trade	and	
development,	now	with	more	‘authority’	
on	 environmental	 issues.	This	 has	 been	
notoriously	the	case	of	the	last	decade.	
bioDiversity as a global 
Common
Biological	diversity	or	biodiversity	is	
a	very	broad	term	that	includes	all	living	
things	on	the	Earth,	from	the	genetic	level	
to	ecosystems.	Moreover,	concepts	such	as	
ecosystems	or	genetic	material	are	not	easy	
to	define	and	are	challenged	by	constant	
scientific	debates.	Flitner	declares	that	the	
term	has	been	used	since	the	1980s	thanks	
to	a	series	of	publications	and	events	with	
heterogeneous	messages	and	contradictory	
statements	from	different	ethical,	conser-
vation,	development	aid	and	economics	
perspectives	(1998:	145-6).	In	addition,	
economics	 discussions	 on	 conservation	
were	 attached	 to	 the	 debate.	 ‘The	 new	
importance	 attributed	 to	market	 forces	
in	Biodiversity	[one	of	the	most	influential	
publication	on	this	topic;	Wilson	1988]	
reflects	both	the	general	ideological	shift	
in	 the	 1980s	 and	 its	material-scientific	
realization-	 the	 new	 technical	 possibili-
ties	through	genetic	engineering.’	(1998:	
147).	 Simultaneously,	 this	 publication	
brings	different	aspects	of	society-nature	
relations	 such	as	 ‘traditional	knowledge’	
of	 indigenous	people	in	the	biodiversity	
discourse	(1998:	147).	
Later,	in	the	1990s,	leading	environ-
mental	organisations	and	the	World	Bank	
‘translated’	the	discourse	into	policy	pa-
pers	that	elevated	the	industry,	the	World	
Bank	and	international	conservation	or-
ganisations	as	the	main	actors	in	preserv-
ing	biological	resources	(1998:	148).	Now	
the	 biodiversity	 discourse	 is	 dominated	
by	 policy	 experts	 and	 economists	 that	
clearly	expressed	a	bias	 towards	markets	
considerations	and	suggests	that	the	core	
of	the	problem	of	biodiversity	loss	is	due	
to	 an	 inadequate	management	 of	 these	
resources	 from	developing	 countries.	 In	
words	of	Swanson	(1997):
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It	is	possible	to	source	biodiversity’s	decline	in	
a	single,	very	broadly	stated	problem:	the	failure	to	
appreciate	and	to	appropriate	the	values	of	biologi-
cal	diversity.		Although	many	different	forms	of	life	
are	endangered	in	the	current	phase	of	decline,	and	
many	different	causes	are	at	work,	the	problem	at	
base	remains	the	same.	(1997:	42)
‘(…)	 the	 problem	 remains	 that	 developing	
countries	 do	not	 see	 these	 [biological	 resources]	
to	 be	 resources	 on	which	 to	 build	 a	 developed	
economy.	 It	 is	 this	 perception	 of	 “investment	
unworthiness”	that	is	the	ultimate	cause	of	biodi-
versity’s	decline,	(…)’	(1997:	43)
Moreover,	those	experts	argue	that	the	
solutions	for	the	biodiversity	problem	are	
in	the	benefits	expected	from	bioprospect-
ing.	The	development	of	the	market	for	
genetic	 resources	was	 ‘presented	 as	 the	
pragmatic	 solution	 to	 biodiversity	 con-
servation.’	 (Boisvert	 and	Vivien	 2005:	
466).	
But	in	which	respects	is	this	discourse	
intermingled	with	the	one	of	global	com-
mons	and	is	reflected	in	the	Convention	
on	Biological	Diversity?
‘Global	 commons’	 is	 a	 term	 that	 is	
widely	used	in	the	environmental	policy	
literature	in	order	to	categorise	different	
types	of	environmental	problems.	How-
ever,	it	is	not	always	clearly	defined	and	
explained	by	its	users	causing	confusion	
when	different	 environmental	 problems	
with	distinct	characteristics	are	qualified	
under	the	same	term.	Then,	what	are	the	
‘global	 commons’	 and	 its	 components?	
Pearce	 defines	 it	 in	 the	 following	way	
(1995:	3):	‘One	of	the	features	of	many	
environmental	problems	is	that	they	occur	
in	context	where	there	are	no	owners,	or	
where	there	are	owners	who	have	only	lim-
ited	“security	of	tenure”.’	Then,	he	contin-
ues,	‘so	it	is	with	global resources	like	the	
atmosphere,	the	stratosphere,	the	oceans,	
and	many of the world’s forests and range-
lands.’	 (emphasis	 added).	Next	he	adds,	
‘Lack	of	ownership,	or	“property	rights”,	
gives	rise	to	neglect	and	over-use.’	
The	above	examples	and	statements	
are	very	contentious	and	especially	for	the	
case	of	biological	diversity	they	seem	not	
to	apply	at	all.	Why	considers	this	author	
many	 forests	 and	 rangelands	 as	 global	
resources	without	owners	or	‘limited	secu-
rity	of	tenure’?	Unlike	the	atmosphere,	the	
stratosphere	and	the	high	seas;	forests	and	
rangelands	are	localised	in	specific	juris-
dictions	of	states	under	different	property	
rights	regimes	and	even	in	‘remote’	areas	
they	might	 be	 inhabited	 by	 indigenous	
and	rural	communities.	Then,	if	this	is	the	
case,	the	last	statement,	probably	inspired	
in	the	Coase’	theorem	and	Hardin’s	a-his-
torical	abstractions,	does	not	apply	either.	
Even	though	this	inherent	contradictions,	
the	global	commons	discourse	has	been	
used	in	approaching	biodiversity	issues.
The	assumption	that	environmental	
problems	 are	 problems	 of	 the	 property	
structure	 is	 recurrent	when	global	 com-
mons	are	mentioned.	According	to	Görg	
and	Brand,	 ‘is	 the	 view	 of	 the	market	
radicals	 that	 the	 problems	 connected	
with	 the	 loss	 of	 diversity	 are	 caused	 by	
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imperfect	 or	 politically	 distorted	 price	
formation’	(2000:	380)	based	on	a	model	
with	 problematic	 suppositions:	 ‘first,	
the	 assumption	 that	 biodiversity	 in	 fact	
does	not	belong	to	anybody;	and	second,	
the	 allegation	 that	 it	 is	 being	destroyed	
because	 it	does	not	belong	 to	anybody.’	
(2000:	 381).	This	 is	 an	 expression	 of	
other	 facet	 of	 the	 ‘global	 commons’	 in	
which	property	rights	are	presented	at	the	
centre	of	the	problem	and	thus	require	a	
reinterpretation	for	a	solution.	Based	on	
different	 study	 cases,	Goldman	 (1998)	
identifies	and	synthesises	the	main	features	
and	consequences	of	the	global	commons	
discourse	(see	Table	1.)
a. Environmental problems are global
b. At the centre of environmental    
 problems are the property rights over  
 nature and/or the lack of   
 management and inappropriate use  
 of natural resources
c. It is necessary to develop a ‘global   
science’ and count on ‘global experts’ 
d. Global institutions are required
The world is portrayed as highly interconnected 
and local impacts to the environment have also 
global consequences.
Different perspectives nurture these ideas. 
One that is rooted in utilitarian tradition and 
the idea of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
that considers that open access regimes to 
natural resources encourage their depletion 
and thus, private rights regimes or strong state 
interventions are needed. Other, encouraged 
by developing experts and ‘global resource 
managers’ (international development 
organisations, northern states think-tanks, 
international NGOs, etc.) propose a centralised 
management of resources, for example through 
international agreements.
Certain knowledge is privileged over other 
and it is assumed that science is independent, 
progressive, value-free and all-knowing. The 
‘local’ is a site for data collection and the 
‘global’ is a site for knowledge production and 
dissemination.
For instance, the creation of multilateral 
environmental agreements, the involvement 
of the UN and its agencies, the participation 
of financial institutions and the creation of 
international environmental founds, is necessary.
table 1. story-lines of the global commons
Source:	author	based	on	Goldman	1998:	1-53.
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Various	 issues	 of	 the	Convention	
on	Biological	Diversity	are	central	to	the	
global	commons’	discourse.	First,	on	 its	
preamble,	the	CBD	recognises	biological	
diversity	as	a	‘common	concern	of	human-
kind’	that	implies	a	global	responsibility	
to	 conserve	 it	 (Kiss	 and	 Shelton	 2004:	
34).	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 the	 preamble	 of	
the	Convention	stresses	 ‘the	importance	
of	biological	diversity	 for	evolution	and	
for	maintaining	 life	 sustaining	 systems	
in	 the	 biosphere’.	However,	 originally	
the	 term	proposed	 in	 the	CBD	was	 the	
concept	of	‘common	heritage	of	mankind’	
which	was	criticised	and	rejected	by	some	
states	because	the	belief	that	it	conveys	the	
idea	that	benefits	derived		from	biologi-
cal	diversity	should	be	shared	with	others	
(Kiss	and	Shelton	2004:	36).	Second,	the	
Convention	establishes	the	states’	sover-
eign	right	to	exploit	their	own	biological	
and	genetic	resources	(Article	3	and	15).	
Third,	the	CBD	has	three	main	objectives;	
two	of	them	are	concerned	on	economic	
and	distributional	 issues.	The	objectives	
are:	i)	The	conservation	of	biological	di-
versity;	ii)	The	sustainable	use	of	its	com-
ponents	and;	 iii)	The	 fair	and	equitable	
sharing	of	the	benefits	arising	out	of	the	
utilisation	of	genetic	resources.
Therefore,	 ‘while	states	have	formal	
sovereignty	over	the	portion	of	biodiver-
sity	within	their	jurisdictions,	there	is	the	
countervailing	perception	that	all	biodi-
versity	is	a	part	of	the	common	heritage	
of	mankind.’	 (Miller	 1998:	 181).	The	
objectives	 of	 the	Convention	 and	 the	
statement	about	sovereignty,	all	together,	
imply	 various	 transformations:	 a	 transi-
tion	from	a	regime	of	open	access	to	one	
in	which	the	access	to	genetic	resources,	
within	the	boundaries	of	states,	is	deter-
mined	by	states	regulations;	the	valuation	
of	the	components	of	biodiversity	not	only	
in	terms	of	intrinsic	value	(conservation	
activities)	 but	 in	monetary	 and	market	
values	 (sustainable	 use)	 and;	 the	 distri-
bution	of	 benefits	 of	 the	 use	 of	 genetic	
resources.	 In	 addition	 to	be	 an	 attempt	
to	regulate	the	environmental	dimension	
of	biodiversity,	the	Convention	deals	with	
critical	political	and	economic	issues	and	
the	 re-shaping	of	property	 regimes	over	
biodiversity.	As	Flitner	described,	
(…)	the	new	legal	framework	can	be	seen	as	
a	materialization	of	some	of	the	central	elements	
of	the	biodiversity	discourse.	It	pretends	a	positive	
correlation	among	the	conservation	of	biodiversity,	
the	growth	of	the	bio-tech	industry,	and	the	accel-
eration	of	capitalization	and	 integration	 into	 the	
world	market	of	“traditional	societies”	with	their	
“undervalued	resources”.	(1998:	156)
Following	the	main	story-line	of	the	
global	commons	discourse	the	CBD	can	
be	 considered	 as	 a	 centralising	 effort	 to	
regulate	 the	public	policies	 related	with	
biodiversity.	Swanson	 (1999)	 states	 that	
the	CBD	is	over	all	an	attempt	to	centralise	
the	management	of	global	land	use	plan-
ning.	This	author	considers	that	‘there	is	
a	need	for	a	division	of	functions	across	
the	globe,	between	lands	used	primarily	
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for	 production	 and	 those	 set	 aside	 for	
a	 diversity	 of	 other	 functions	 (research	
and	development,	recreation	and	leisure,	
knowledge	 and	 information).’	 (1999:	
308).	The	questions	that	arise	are:	whose	
need	is	the	one	that	Swanson	mentioned?	
Who	will	be	benefited	from	this	division	
of	functions	and	who	will	be	affected	from	
this	global	centralisation	of	land	use	plan-
ning?	This	questions	lead	to	the	issues	of	
sovereignty	 and	 global	 authority	 in	 the	
context	of	the	CBD.
the signifiCanCe of the 
Convention in sovereignty 
anD global authority
The	‘battle’	for	the	global	commons	
is	over	power	and	control	of	natural	re-
sources.	In	words	of	Goldman:
Different	 social	actors	fighting	 for	different	
property	rights:	resource-dependant	communities	
for	sustenance	and	culturally	meaningful	practices,	
corporations	 for	 commodity	 and	 surplus-value	
production	and	state	agencies	for	tax	revenues	and	
increased	 jurisdiction	–	all	are	fighting	 for	rights	
to	 environments	on	which	 their	power	depends.	
(1998:	2)
The	global	commons	discourse	does	
not	oppose	to	the	idea	of	major	territorial	
sovereignty	because	it	supports	the	further	
appropriation	of	natural	resources	in	order	
to	avoid	the	suppose	lack	of	management	
and	property.	As	Sand	pointed	out	for	the	
UN	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	in	
1982,	it	‘formally	extended	the	sovereign	
rights	of	coastal	states	to	the	vast	new	area	
of	“exclusive	economic	zones”,	estimated	
to	contain	25	percent	of	global	primary	
production	and	90	percent	of	the	world’s	
fish	 catch.’	 (IWCO	cited	 in	Sand	2004:	
47).	Ten	 years	 later	 the	Convention	on	
Biological	Diversity	‘in	article	15	extended	
sovereign	rights	to	the	even	vaster	range	of	
plant	and	animal	genetic	resources,	thereby	
enclosing	access	to	another	major	chunk	of	
what	had	once	been	considered	“heritage	
of	mankind”.’	(Sands	2004:	47-48).	
However,	in	the	case	of	the	CBD	the	
main	 sovereignty	 concern	was	 from	 the	
developing	countries	that	considered	that	
the	 conditions	 of	 ‘free-access’	 in	which	
many	northern-based	industries	use	their	
biodiversity	was	not	equal.	In	this	sense,	
the	 gain	 in	 sovereignty	was	 particularly	
important	for	countries	with	high	levels	
of	biodiversity,	which	in	a	great	majority	
are	 developing	 countries.	 As	 described	
by	Conca,	authority	over	 the	control	of	
natural	 resources	 has	 been	 historically	
important	for	state	legitimacy:
‘Historically,	the	ability	to	control	rules	of	ac-
cess	to	the	environment	and	natural	resources	–	to	
define	who	may	alter,	and	to	what	extent,	which	
specific	natural	materials,	 systems,	 and	processes	
–	has	been	a	central	component	of	state	authority	
and	legitimacy.	Thus	the	full	effects	of	international	
environmental	pressures	on	state	sovereignty	as	a	
collective	institution	cannot	be	understood	without	
examining	this	inward-looking	dimension.	This	is	
particularly	 so	 for	much	of	 the	South,	given	 the	
p r o b l e m a s  a m b i e n t a l e s 
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legacy	of	colonialism	and	the	orientation	of	so	many	
Third	World	political	economies	toward	commod-
ity	exports.’	(1994:	707)
Even	more	significant	for	developing	
countries	is	the	fact	that	the	Convention	
‘link	access	to	genetic	resources	to	the	eq-
uitable	sharing	of	benefits	related	to	those	
resources.’	 (Diaz	 cited	 in	 ICTSD	2006:	
1).	‘The	CBD	proposes	a	mechanism	for	
access	to	valuable	biological	resources	on	
fair	grounds,	that	is,	on	“mutually	agreed	
terms”	and	subject	to	the	“prior	informed	
consent”	of	the	country	of	origin.’	(ICTSD	
2006:	 1).	 In	 addition,	 the	 facilitation	
of	 transfer	 of	 technology	 is	 stressed	 in	
the	Convention	 (Article	 16).	 In	 similar	
terms,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	Article	
15	also	implies	‘(…)	to	create	conditions	
to	facilitate access to genetic resources	(…)’	
(emphasis	added).	The	general	idea	seems	
that	there	is	now	sovereignty	over	genetic	
resources	but	it	also	implies	a	responsibil-
ity	and	the	condition	to	facilitate	access	to	
genetic	resources.	‘Thus,	although	some	
phrases	in	the	convention	seem	to	oppose	
extensive	IPR	[intellectual	property	rights]	
protection	on	“living	material”,	the	CBD	
favours	this	approach	as	it	balances	IPRs	
one	the	one	hand	and	rights	to	biodiversity	
on	the	other.’	(Flitner	1998:	156).
However,	this	set	of	new	rights	was	
not	well	accepted	by	transnational	corpo-
rations.	For	instance,	‘(…)	biotechnology	
interests	vetoed	US	support	of	the	CBD	
on	the	grounds	that	its	IPR	[intellectual	
property	rights]	language	was	not	strong	
enough	and	that	its	provisions	for	transfer	
of	 biotechnology	might	 threaten	 their	
commercial	 interests.’	 (various	 authors	
cited	in	McAfee	2003:	211).	Now,	more	
than	a	decade	after	 the	 signature	of	 the	
CDB,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 coalitions	of	 in-
dustrialised	 countries	 and	 transnational	
corporations	 gain	 power	 and	 authority	
trough	 other	 international	 regime,	 the	
trade	regime,	minimizing	and	even	threat-
ening	the	‘gains’	of	the	CBD	for	develop-
ing	and	rich-biodiversity	countries.	‘(…)	
what	the	TRIPS	agreement	in	particular,	
but	 the	GATT-94	 and	GATS-94	 agree-
ment	in	general,	signify	is	that	“[c]arried	
to	its	logical	conclusion,	it	promises	the	
trade-based	dismantling	of	three	decades	
of	global	environmental	rule-making	and	
the	selling	of	important	dimensions	of	the	
global	commons”.’	(Conca	cited	in	Saurin	
2001:	79).	
Contrary	 to	 expectations,	 ‘the	 (…)	
“green	 gold”	 rush	 did	 not	 take	 place	
and	 the	 timelines	of	basing	biodiversity	
conservation	 policies	 on	 a	 contractual	
approach	 as	 initially	 planned	 should	 be	
reconsidered.’	 (Koo	 and	Wight	 cited	 in	
Boisvert	and	Vivien	2005:	466).	Different	
reasons	explained	why	this	‘promise’	have	
not	 been	 realised.	 Boisvert	 and	Vivien	
mentioned,	among	other	causes,	that	the	
pharmaceutical	 industry,	which	used	 to	
be	the	main	bioprospecting	industry,	ex-
plored	different	paths	in	research	and	did	
not	show	great	interest	in	bioprospecting	
the	 plants	 of	 Southern	 countries	 in	 the	
last	 decade	 (2005:	 467).	Moreover,	 the	
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play-ground	of	the	CBD	makes	develop-
ing	countries	and	communities	who	hold	
valuable	 genetic	 resources	 to	 compete	
with	 each	 other,	 ‘while	 on	 the	 demand	
side	 the	multinational	companies	are	 in	
oligopoly	positions.’	(Boisvert	and	Vivien	
2005:	467).	It	can	be	inferred	from	this	
competition	and	marked	asymmetry	that,	
in	one	hand,	coalitions	of	industry	and	de-
veloped	countries	can	and	are	possible	in	
the	international	arena;	on	the	other	hand,	
a	developing	countries	coalition,	united	by	
their	condition	of	‘megadiverse’,	is	fragile	
because	these	countries	are	competitors.	In	
Fact,	ecosystems	and	biological	resources	
are	 shared	 transboundary,	 for	 example,	
in	terms	of	ecoregions,	the	Amazon,	the	
Orinoco	basin	or	the	Andes	are	shared	by	
various	states.				
Additionally,	 national	 institutions	
and	 legal	 frameworks	 as	well	 as	 techni-
cal	 capacities	 to	 operate	 nationally	 the	
mandates	of	the	CDB	in	many	develop-
ing	 countries	 are	 still	 not	 in	 operation.	
Governments	should	make	legitimate	this	
process	for	locals	such	as	indigenous	peo-
ples	and	peasants	which	are	now	consid-
ered	‘stakeholders’.	These	locals	do	not	use	
the	categories	of	‘genetic	resources’	in	their	
day-to-day	and	the	significance	of	biologi-
cal	resources	is	more	than	economic	value.	
These	locals	in	rich-biodiversity	countries	
rely	on	natural	resources	for	their	subsist-
ence;	and	ecosystems	are	attached	to	social	
and	cultural	values.	‘With	the	concentra-
tion	 of	 political	 efforts	 to	 regulate	 the	
global	 environmental	 problem	 of	 “loss	
of	 biodiversity”	 on	 the	management	 of	
the	 global	 commons,	 traditional	 forms	
of	use	and	claims	are	ignored	or	even	ac-
cused	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	
diversity.’	(Görg	and	Brand	2000:	384).	
This	appears	to	be	a	paradox,	because	the	
CBD	and	 its	Decisions	 recognize	 other	
values	of	biodiversity	and	ways	of	living	
from	 locals	 and	encourage	governments	
to	 protect	 ‘traditional	 knowledge’,	 as	 it	
is	stated	on	the	article	8	(j).	However,	in	
practice	governments	should	make	these	
rights	operational	and	exercise	legitimacy	
and	authority	with	communities	that	not	
always	 recognise	 this	 authority	 or	 that	
have	conflict	situations	unresolved.	
All	 the	 circumstances	mentioned	
above	 illustrate	 how	 sovereignty	 is	 ex-
tended	‘on	the	paper’	but	the	reality	con-
straints	its	exercise.	In	this	respect,	Conca	
stresses	 that	 sovereignty	 should	not	 just	
be	considered	as	a	‘norm’	but	also	a	‘fact’	
based	on	material	and	organisational	ca-
pabilities	of	states:	‘(…)	sovereignty	looks	
inward	as	well	as	outward.	If	finds	its	basis	
not	only	in	autonomy	relative	to	external	
actors,	but	also	in	the	state’s	jurisdictional	
power	 over	 civil	 society.’	 (1994:	 707).	
Therefore,	 ‘sovereignty	 demands	 ‘some	
minimal	level	of	social	recognition	of	the	
state’s	 legitimacy’	 as	well	 as	 ‘a	 complex	
bundle	of	state	capabilities.’	(1994:	707).	
Thus,	sovereignty	should	be	understood	
dynamically:	 ‘(…)	we	 cannot	 describe	
in	 universal	 terms	 either	 the	 processes	
rendering	states	sovereign	or	 the	way	 in	
which	they	may	be	changing	as	a	result	of	
p r o b l e m a s  a m b i e n t a l e s 
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ecological	 interdependence.	 Sovereignty	
as	a	global	institution	changes	because	of	
what	happens	to	different	states	over	time,	
at	different	 rates	and	 in	different	ways.’	
(Conca	1994:	706)
On	the	other	hand,	some	non-state	
actors	 and	 international	 organisations	
gained	 authority	 and	 influence	 with	
the	 global	 commons	 and	 biodiversity	
discourse.	The	 issue	 of	 conservation	 of	
biological	 resources	was	 tackled	 by	 en-
vironmental	NGOs	since	the	1950s	and	
many	 of	 them	were	 involved	 in	 trying	
to	shape	a	world	strategy	for	biodiversity	
(Miller	1995:	121).	As	 it	was	explained	
before,	some	NGOs	helped	to	construct	
the	 discourse	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 global	
commons.	Moreover,	they	have	been	very	
active	supporting	the	creation	of	the	CDB	
and	its	implementation.	As	scientific	and	
international	 authorities,	 some	NGOs	
advised	the	World	Bank	in	relation	with	
the	Global	Environment	Facility	(Flitner	
1998:	159),	the	international	found	that	
supports	 the	operation	of	 the	CBD	and	
paid	thousands	of	projects	and	initiatives	
around	 the	 globe.	They	 are	 part	 of	 the	
‘global	experts’	that	with	the	institutions,	
material	capacities	and	resources	help	to	
reinforce	the	discourse	of	biodiversity.	
ConClusion
The	 discourse	 of	 the	 ‘global	 com-
mons’	underlies	the	terms	of	the	Conven-
tion	on	Biological	Diversity,	however,	 it	
implies	wrong	explanations	and	assump-
tions	about	biodiversity	and	has	a	strong	
bias	to	market	solutions.	This	discourse,	
in	one	of	its	main	story-lines,	justifies	an	
expansion	of	 the	control	over	biological	
resources	 and	 the	 commodification	 of	
biodiversity.	Thus,	 the	Convention	 on	
Biological	Diversity	can	be	understood	as	
an	attempt	 to	 re-shape	state	 sovereignty	
and	 global	 authority	 over	 the	multiple	
forms	of	biological	resources,	and	facilitate	
the	 recognition	 and	 valuation	 of	 these	
resources	for	a	wider	 incorporation	into	
the	global	economy.	The	CDB	set	a	mix	
and	 contradictory	 legal	 framework	 that	
calls	 for	 the	preservation	of	biodiversity	
and	its	wider	appropriation.	
While	the	global	commons	discourse	
of	the	CBD	gives	more	authority	to	some	
actors	 such	 as	 international	NGOs	 and	
international	organisations,	 the	gains	 in	
terms	of	state	sovereignty	are	controversial.	
The	extension	of	sovereignty	over	genetic	
resources,	as	a	‘norm’	has	proved	difficult	
to	 turn	 into	 a	 real	 ‘fact’.	On	 the	 other	
hand,	local	communities	that	depend	on	
biodiversity	are	relegated	in	this	discourse,	
even	though	their	rights	seem	to	be	recog-
nised	‘on	the	paper’,	they	have	to	adopt	the	
categories	and	assumptions	of	the	global	
commons	discourse.	
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